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Executive Summary
·  Food manufacturing industries in the U.S. are more highly concentrated than in Europe.  The top 20 firms account for
52% of the sector’s value added and approximately 70% of the sector’s advertising.  Thus, branded food product
marketing is more concentrated among the sector’s top firms.
·  Supermarket concentration at the local market level is high and has increased substantially over the past decade.  For 94
large U.S. cities four-firm concentration averaged 74.4 % in 1998, up from 64.5% in 1987.
·  Supermarket concentration in many regions comparable in size to countries in Western Europe has also increased and is
approaching European level.  For example, the top four chains in California (population 32 million) now account for
70% of supermarket sales.
·  National supermarket concentration has also increased but not to such high levels.  The top four chains accounted for
31.7% of total U.S. sales in 1998, up from 23.3% in 1992.
·  Foreign firms, most notably Ahold, Tengelmann, Sainsbury and Del Haize, are major players in U.S. retailing; however,
leading U.S. chains, Kroger, Albertsons and Safeway are also participating in the merger wave that has been the primary
source of increased retail concentration at local, regional, and national levels.
·  High concentration and strong brands at the manufacturing level combine with high local market concentration at the
retail to create a vertical coordination problem.  Double marginalization due to the exercise of market power at
successive stages of the food channel means prices are higher and total channel profits are lower than they would be with
joint, or vertically coordinated pricings by retailers and manufacturers.  Many systems innovations including efficient
consumer response, (ECR) and category management programs are best seen as attempts to eliminate double
marginalization.
·  Every day low pricing (EDLP) programs have failed to supplant trade promotion, which in the ECR framework is seen
as inefficient and wasteful, because trade promotion is one of the most effective strategies for eliminating double
marginalization.
·  Copycat private labels are an alternative coordination strategy that lower prices to consumers and allow retailers to
capture a larger share of increased channel profits.
·  National market concentration may well double in the near future if the leading chains, which are still essentially
regional, merge to form truly national supermarket chains.
·  Truly national supermarket chains may attain the critical mass needed to establish retailer brands as leading European
chains have done with supply chain management systems that tap into the creativity and flexibility of smaller food
manufacturers.  This “out of the box” solution could severely diminish the position and power of the large food
manufacturers and smaller supermarket chains.
·  Antitrust enforcement in the U.S. has not impeded the steady rise in concentration at all stages of the U.S. food system.
However, support for more vigorous merger enforcement may soon come from major players within the sector.  Since
the context of antitrust is now “double monopoly” public actions to limit mergers that tend to create monopoly power at
one stage of the channel benefit not only consumers but also firms at other stages who capture higher channel profits.
Powerful firms at one stage of the food marketing channel have a vested interest in preventing mergers that create or
sustain powerful firms at other stages.
·  In the current environment the Robinson Patman Act, with its proscription of discriminatory discounts by manufacturers
to large retailers, i.e. better trade terms that are not cost justified, may become a more binding constraint.
·  Ultimately, the evolution and performance of the U.S. food system depends upon strategic moves by leading global
manufacturers and retailers and public policy actions, especially antitrust enforcement.  Given the current unstable
environment, the stakes for winners and losers in this game are very high.Continuing Concentration in the US Cotterill
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1. Introduction
Both food retailing and food manufacturing
industries continue to consolidate in the U.S.  The most
recent wave of consolidation at the manufacturing level
occurred in the 1980s, and the sector is more
concentrated than food manufacturing is in Western
Europe.  Seller concentration in U.S. supermarket
retailing has accelerated during the 1990s and is rapidly
approaching European levels.  The U.S. food system has
traditionally been led by its large, often global, food
manufacturers with retailers serving a passive and
cooperative role as shopkeepers for manufacturer’s
branded products.  Today, however, the increase in retail
concentration and power in distribution channels is
fundamentally altering retailer-manufacturer relations.
No one knows with certainty how this dynamic scenario
will play out.  It depends on strategic moves by the
world’s leading food firms and public policy, especially
antitrust enforcement.
This paper documents key trends in concentration at
both the manufacturing and retailing level in the U.S.
Recent mergers have been a major contributor to retail
concentration.  Many of the recent innovations in
vertical coordination including Efficient Consumer
Response (ECR), Every Day Low Pricing (EDLP),
category management and other strategic moves are best
understood as responses to increasing concentration at
all stages of the post farm gate food system.  The
channel now has “shared” monopoly, i.e. tight oligopoly
at both the manufacturing and retail stages.  There is a
need for vertical coordination between manufacturers
and retailers to supplant market price determination in
wholesale and retail markets.  Large manufacturers, with
category dominant national brands, and large
supermarket chains that occupy powerful positions in
many local food markets must rely on more than
independent product pricing (what economists call
vertical Nash pricing) to reduce “double
marginalization.”  As we show below reducing double
marginalization, i.e. the exercise of market power at two
stages in the channel increases total channel profits and
lowers prices to consumers.
From a public policy perspective, for whatever
reason, antitrust policy has been ineffective in limiting
concentration and the exercise of market power in food
industries.  Now we face compound market power.
Antitrust challenges that enhance competition at one
stage of the marketing channel should have support not
only from consumers but also powerful firms at other
stages of the market channel because such actions
increase their profits.
Box 1: External Forces Driving Observed Changes in the
Food System
Several forces, external to the food industry, are driving
changes in the system that offer challenges and opportunities
for manufacturers and retailers:
·  Information technology is reconfiguring business
organization and procedures with major gains in labor
productivity and ability to manage.  First generation uniform
communication system/uniform product code scanning
systems are universal.  Second generation intranet and internet
technologies are rapidly gaining acceptance.
·  Biotechnology and other food science technologies are
creating new functional foods for health needs.
·  The revolution in communications is directly affecting the
ability of food firms to advertise and build brands.  Mass-
market advertising is being fragmented into much finer
consumer segments via the offer of multiple cable TV
channels.  Indirectly, the revolution in communications,
including mobil telephones, faxes, e-mails, etc., is creating a
society where instant gratification is common.  Consumers
have low tolerance for cumbersome, time consuming
relationships, including food shopping and food preparation.
·  U.S. consumers envision an affluent, multicultural global
society in the future.  Travel, trade, and open communication
ensure this.  Diversity in the workplace will increase and be
valued.  Incomes will continue their recent strong growth.  A
recent survey finds that 51 percent of U.S. teenagers expect to
“live outside of country of birth”.  This compares to 37
percent for European teenagers (Quelch).
Strategic Implications
·  Food manufacturers must move beyond traditional old-
line brands and line extensions thereof to apply their branding
skills to truly new food products that consumers find novel,
interesting and valuable.  This includes moving beyond
“ethnic” food to international cuisines, sourced globally.
·  Food retailers may find advantage in reconfiguring the
superstore to offer more than rows of shelves with groceries
arranged by product category for preparation at home.
Superstores will take advantage of new technologies and
demographic trends by offering cuisine areas (Chinese,
Mexican, Italian, Indian) with prepared food entrees for on-
site or at home consumption, and chilled entrees for use at
home, as well as packaged groceries for preparation at home.
·  Executives in both manufacturing and retailing will of
necessity need a global view of the food system to capitalize
on external forces affecting the food system.Continuing Concentration in the US Cotterill
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2. Food and Tobacco Manufacturer Concentration in
the U.S.: Who are the Major Players and How
Dominant are They?
The U.S. food manufacturing system is highly
concentrated with relatively few large firms dominating
the sector.  Table 1 lists the top 25 food processing
companies for 1998 in the United States.  Philip Morris
companies with 31 billion in food sales leads the list.
The top ten companies all had more than 10 billion
dollars in annual sales in 1998.  For comparison, a 1997
study of European food manufacturing lists only 3
companies with annual sales of over 10 billion dollars.
(FT Study, Ramsay 1997).  They are Nestle (38.8 billion
dollars), Unilever (26.7 billion dollars) and Danone
(12.8 billion dollars).  Twelve European companies, as
opposed to 25 American companies, have sales of over 4
billion dollars annually.  The American list includes only
the U.S. sales of Nestle.  Nestle is ranked number 14.  If
Nestle total company sales were, in fact, included, as is
the case for the other American companies on this list, it
would rank number one.
Figure 1 documents the increase in dominance by
the top 20 food and tobacco manufacturing companies
over the past 30 years.  In 1995, the top 20 food and
tobacco manufacturing companies are estimated to
account for over 52 percent of the sector’s value added.
This is up from 23 percent of value added in 1967.  In
1995, if one adds the value added from the remaining
top 100 food manufacturers they account for 77 percent
of the sector’s value added.  This figure is up from 50.8
percent of value added in 1967.
Since advertising is the key component in branded
food product marketing, an examination of company
advertising outlays gives us an indication of who the
major players are in branded food product marketing.
Table 2 lists the top 21 advertisers in the food and
tobacco processing sector for 1997.  Sixteen of these
leading advertisers are among the top 25 food processing
companies in the country.  Philip Morris leads both lists
and is far and away the largest food advertiser with
advertising expenditures of over 1.3 billion dollars in
1997.  Note that the top 20 advertisers in food and
tobacco processing accounted for 71.9 percent of all
food advertising in 1997.  This compares 52 percent
value added in 1995.  Thus, food advertising and
branded food product production is even more
concentrated than all food and tobacco manufacturing
activity.  Fresh product, i.e. fruit, vegetable, and meat
industry concentration is also very high at the packer
stage with a few agricultural cooperatives, as well as
private firms,  capturing large market shares.
From the standpoint of food manufacturer/food
retailer relationships it is clear that food retailers are
dealing with relatively few large organizations for a very
significant proportion of the products that they sell in
their supermarkets.  Moreover, these companies sell
highly differentiated products that have strong consumer
acceptance;  i.e. these brands have relatively inelastic
demand curves.
3. Food Retailer Concentration in the U.S.: Local
Market, Regional and National Concentration
Estimates
Commentaries on retailer power often do not
appreciate the important distinction between
supermarket concentration in local city markets and
aggregate concentration measured at the regional or
national level.  They quickly leap to the latter and the
issue of “bargaining power” against manufacturers
assuming that it is the paramount issue.  This is a
mistake, because the problem of successive monopoly
and its attendant demand for increased coordination
between manufacturers and retailer is, by far, more
important for understanding today’s market place.  Local
market concentration measures the ability of
supermarkets to exercise market power to raise retail
prices.  Figure 2 reports the distribution of four firm
concentration ratios in 94 of the top 100 U.S. cities for
1987 and 1998.  There is a clear upward shift in four-
firm concentration over this 11-year period.  For
example, in 1997 one third of these markets (31) had
four-firm concentration above 80 percent of supermarket
sales.  In 1987 only 12 markets were that concentrated.
Four firm concentration for 1998 averaged 74.4 percent.
In 1987 four firm concentration averaged 64.5 percent.
Markets with four-firm concentration above 60 percent
would routinely be expected to offer selling
supermarkets some ability to exercise market power over
retail prices.  (See Box 2 on the relationship between
seller concentration and price.)  All but 12 of these 94
markets had four-firm concentration above 60 percent.
Table 3 gives the mean value for metropolitan
statistical area concentration ratios for selected regions
of the country as well as for the entire country.  Local
market concentration is highest in California at 90.7
percent average and lowest in the Midwest at 69.3
percent in 1998.  Local market concentration uniformly
increased throughout the country.
Since European authors often quote country level
concentration ratios when discussing European food
retailing, I have computed regional concentration ratios
for regions of the United States that are of a similar size
to European countries.  Table 4 gives such concentrationContinuing Concentration in the US Cotterill
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Box 2: The Relationship between Local Market
Concentration and Prices
Figure 3 is an illustration of the relationship between
market concentration and price levels.  Prices for several
Royal Ahold supermarkets for a set of local markets with
variation in concentration were collected in March 1999.  The
lowest priced supermarket was assigned an index value of
100.  Prices across these markets were as much as 20 percent
higher than the lowest priced store.  Some of this price
variation is due to factors other than market concentration;
however, as this plot reveals a very significant proportion of
observed price variation is explained by market
concentration.*
Market concentration in Figure 3 is measured by the
Herfindahl Index, which is the sum of the square of each
market share.  The Herfindahl ranges from near zero (many
small share firms) to 10,000 (one firm with 100 percent
SOM).  Four-firm concentration ratios are highly correlated
with the Herfindahl.  A four-firm ratio of 60 percent is roughly
equivalent to a Herfindahl value of 1,000.  A four-firm ratio of
80 percent is roughly equivalent to a Herfindahl of 1,800.  The
U.S. federal merger guidelines consider markets with
Herfindahls below 1,000 to so unconcentrated as to offer no
chance for the exercise of market power.  Between 1,000 and
1,800, the exercise of power is deemed feasible.  Above 1,800
the U.S. government becomes very concerned.  Figure 3
supports the government’s conjecture.  Between 1,000 and
2,000 prices clearly rise, and thereafter, the price rise
continues but at a less steep rate.
*Fitting a logarithmic line to these data explains 60.1 percent
of the variation in price.
ratios for 1992, and Table 5 gives them for 1998 so that
we can evaluate in detail the increase in retail
concentration for these regions of the United States.  In
Table 4 the state of California with population of 29.7
million had four-firm concentration of 50.1% in 1992.
Four-firm concentration for the state of Florida with
population of 12.9 million was 77.7% in 1992,
considerably higher than for the state of California.  The
Northeast and the upper Midwest both had four-firm
concentration ratios of roughly 31% in 1992.
Moving now to Table 5, by 1998 four-irm
concentration in the state of California had increased
19.7 points to 69.8%.  This dramatic increase of four
firm concentration is due primarily to two major mergers
in California.  Albertsons acquired American Stores, and
Safeway acquired the Von’s grocery store company.  By
1998 concentration in the state of Florida also increased
increasing 10 points to 87.7%.  In the Northeast with a
population of 57.9 million people, which is similar in
size to the United Kingdom, four-firm concentration
increased 10.7 percentage points to 41.3 percent.  Again,
a major source of this increase in four-firm concentration
was mergers between firms in the region, especially
mergers under the Royal Ahold corporate umbrella.  In
1992 Ahold wasn’t even listed in the top 5 retailers for
the Northeast region, but by 1998 it was ranked first
because it had acquired the Stop & Shop chain in New
England, the Giant Food chain in Washington, D.C. and
Baltimore, and the Pathmark chain in the greater New
York City region.  Note also that Sainsbury with its
acquisition of Shaw’s and Star Markets in New England
joined the Tengelmann/A&P chain in the top 4 ranking
for the Northeast.  Thus, 3 of the 4 leading supermarket
chains in Northeastern United States are now European
owned.
In the upper Midwest, retail concentration increased
only 2.3 percentage points to 34 percent of the market.
The region was relatively calm on the merger front,
however, Safeway acquired the Chicago based
Dominick’s chain and the Jewel chain, a subsidiary of
American stores, was acquired by Albertsons.
Note that the regional four-firm concentration ratios
in Table 5 are all uniformly lower than the
corresponding average local market concentration ratios
for cites and that are reported in Table 3.  For example,
local market concentration in California in 1998 in its 6
major cities averaged 90.7 percent, which is significantly
higher than the statewide four-firm concentration ratio of
69.8.  This means regional concentration ratios
uniformly tend to understate local market concentration
and thus uniformly tend to understate the degree of seller
power that supermarket chains have in local geographic
markets.  This insight also holds for country vs. local
city market comparisons in Europe.  The relevant
concentration figures are for local urban food markets,
e.g., Manchester or Birmingham, or possibly sections of
such major urban areas, not the total U.K.
Table 5 also gives the regional dollar sales and the
total U.S. corporate sales for each chain.  For, multi-
national chains it gives a total global sales as well.  Note
that Walmart with 136.6 billion dollars (which includes
all of its non-food operations as well as its food
operations globally) is by far the largest retail
organization.  Kroger is next with total sales all in the
US of 43 billion dollars, then Albertsons with total sales,
again all in the US, of 35.7 billion.  Three leading
European chains rank among the largest retailers
globally.  The Tengelmann chain has total sales of 29.6
billion (10.5 billion in the United States.)  The Ahold
chain has global sales of 25.9 billion with 19.7 billion in
the United States and the Sainsbury chain has a total
global sales of 23.8 billion with only 4.2 billion in the
United States.Continuing Concentration in the US Cotterill
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Moving on to national market concentration one
finds a significantly weaker but very visible trend
towards increased concentration.  Table 6 reports the
sales and market share position for the top 20
supermarket chains in 1992.  The top four chains
nationally in 1992 were Kroger, American Stores,
Safeway and A&P/Tengelmann.  Those four firms
together, however, accounted for only 23.3% of US
supermarket sales.  The top 20 firms in 1992 accounted
for 51.0% of supermarket sales in 1998.  Table 7 shows
that top chain, Kroger, increased sales by 21.9 billion
dollars to 43.1 billion.  Kroger’s market share increased
from 7.7% in 1992 to 10.8% in 1998.  Much of this gain
was due to acquisitions (see Table 8.).  The number 2
chain in 1998 is the combination of Albertsons and
American at 35.7 billion with an 8.9 percent market
share.  The number 3 chain is the combination of
Safeway and Vons with 25 billion in sales and 6.2%
market share.  The number 4 chain is the Ahold
companies, which moved up from number 8 in 1992 to
sales of 23.4 billion in 1998 and a market share of 5.8%.
The top four firms in 1998 account for 31.7% of the
market up from 23.3% in 1992.  The top 20 firms in
1998 accounted for 60.4% of the market, up 10.2
percentage points from 1992.  Thus, we can conclude if
one is comparing national concentration to national
concentration across the Atlantic, concentration at the
national level is indeed lower in the United States than it
is in most of the smaller European nations.  However,
American supermarket chains are larger in absolute
dollar volume size than European companies in Europe.
This suggests that they should, if anything, enjoy larger
economies of scale and scope related to the production
and physical distribution of food products than European
chains.
With regard to the exercise of retailer power against
manufacturers and other suppliers in the food system,
local and regional concentration may be more important
than national concentration because suppliers can’t
threaten to switch sales to other geographic localities.
Fully national distribution is important to them.  This
improves retailers’ bargaining position in any
coordination games and is a major reason for the rise in
slotting allowances, street money, and other transfers to
retailers.
Table 8 lists the major supermarket mergers for 1991
through the first half of 1999.  Kroger’s acquisition
conduct is a classic example of smaller fish being
swallowed by progressively larger fish.  Kroger, the big
fish, acquired Fred Meyer in 1998, which acquired
Ralphs and Quality Foods in 1997, and Quality Foods
acquired Hughes in 1996.  Over the 1991 to 1999 period,
the aggregate value (price paid) for acquired
supermarkets relative to their annual sales has increased
from the .2 to .3 range in 1991 to the .5 to .8 range in
1998-99.  Acquirers are now paying a higher premium
per dollar retail sales.  To make such a merger pay for
acquiring firm shareholders, even larger efficiencies
and/or more pricing power needs to flow from the
combination.
In summary, two related major forces contributed to
increased retail concentration in the United States during
the 1990s: the entry of European chains into US markets,
and mergers.  In many instances these mergers had
significant horizontal components, i.e., the merged
chains competed with each other in one or more local
geographic markets. Only one merger was stopped by
antitrust authorities.  The state of California successfully
challenged the American Stores-Lucky merger forcing
American to divest its Alpha Beta chain to Food 4 Less
in 1991 (see Table 8).  In all other mergers Federal
Trade Commission and state antitrust authorities have
routinely forced divestiture of only overlapping stores in
an attempt to preserve competition.  The regional and
local market concentration data presented here, however,
indicate that in spite of antitrust authority efforts,
concentration has increased significantly.  Recently,
individual firms, the American Antitrust Institute, and
other trade associations representing consumers, farmers,
and food firms, have called for stiffer anti-merger
enforcement in food industries, especially food retailing
(Foer, 1999, Cotterill, 1999b).
4. Shifting Power Balances Drive New Coordination
Programs
In the 1980s leading food-manufacturing firms
enjoyed powerful market positions with strongly
differentiated brands supported by significant
advertising expenditures.  Their position has not
appreciably changed since then, however, the position of
food retailers has.  Local market retail concentration has
increased significantly giving retailers the ability to
exercise market power on a more systematic and
pervasive basis than in the 1980s.  Consequently, we
have a food system that is predominantly served by
powerful food manufacturers selling to powerful food
retailers.
A successive monopoly model of the distribution
channel captures the essence of the channel coordination
problem in the U.S.  Food manufacturing industries such
as carbonated beverages, breakfast cereal, and beer are
tight oligopolies that sell highly differentiated brands
that have reasonably inelastic (-1.5 to -3.0) brand level
demand curves at retail (Tellis, 1988, Cotterill et al.
1996, Langan and Cotterill 1994, Langan 1997, MaContinuing Concentration in the US Cotterill
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1997, Nevo 1997, Cotterill and Haller 1997).  The
observed brand inelasticity is primarily due to product
differentiation, however, some is also due to coordinated
pricing, i.e. price followship tends to reduce brand
elasticities (Cotterill et al. 2000).  Consumer pull
advertising and promotion by the brand manufacturer
reduces any bargaining power of buying groups
(Cotterill 1997, Gerstner and Hess, 1991).  Consumers
want the brand so retailers must carry it.  Thus each
brand tends to be a monopoly; i.e. its food manufacturers
face a brand level demand curve that has slope. As we
have explained, however, retailers also have market
power in the local markets where they sell products due
to high seller concentration in such local markets (Also
see Marion et al. 1979, Weiss, 1989, Cotterill, 1986,
1999a, Foer, 1999).
Spengler (1950) was the first to analyze the impact
of successive monopoly on channel coordination and
economic efficiency.  Figure 4 can be used to explain the
problem.
1  D r is the retailers demand curve.   MRr  is
the corresponding retail marginal revenue curve.  If we
assume, without loss of generality and for ease of
illustration, that the retailer has a fixed cost of retailing
and that the only variable cost is the purchase of the
product  Q, then the retailers marginal cost is the
manufacturer price, w.  Since a profit maximizing
retailer always equates marginal revenue and marginal
cost ( MR w r = ) the retailers marginal revenue curve is
the demand curve for Q at the manufacturer level.  The
manufacturer therefore equates the marginal revenue of
the retailers input demand curve ( MRm) to its marginal
cost of manufacturing the product.  In other words, the
manufacturer computes the marginal revenue of the
retailer’s marginal revenue, hence the name double
marginalization.  In Figure 4 the profit maximizing
manufacturer offer quantityQ2  at price p1 = w, and the
profit maximizing retailer sells this quantity at price  p2 .
If the two firms integrated the new single monopolist
would maximize profits by lowering price to  p1 and
sellingQ1.  The integrated firm’s total profits are greater
than the profits of the two successive monopolists.
The implications of this double marginalization
phenomena are very real for the US food marketing
system today.  Food manufacturers and food retailers,
can in fact, increase their profits if they discard
independent pricing practices and talk to each other to
coordinate pricing and other terms of trade.  To the
                                               
1 This analysis of double marginalization to explain formally
the role of trade promotions and private labels in the food
system was first presented in Cotterill (1999d).
extent that retailers also have power in wholesale
markets, this “big buyer power” affects their bargaining
ability to capture a larger share of the coordination gains.
The double marginalization model predicts that vertical
coordination will increase channel profits and lower
prices to consumers.  This is a very rare win-win
situation in economics, the “dismal science” of trade
offs!
With this economic model one can begin to
understand why strategic moves such as the efficient
consumer response (ECR) program with its everyday
low pricing (EDLP) component was only partially
successful.  ECR moves to improve the logistical flow of
products through the system, such as just-in-time
inventory management procedures, have been successful
because they reduce cost.  However, one of the largest
projected savings due to the innovation of ECR was
related to the elimination of stop-go price promotions via
the establishment of everyday low prices (EDLP)
throughout the food system.  EDLP didn’t work and
savings due to smoother product flow haven’t accrued.
EDLP has failed in the United States precisely because
of the need for trade promotion programs as a vehicle to
control or eliminate double marginalization in the
channel.
Consider Figure 5.  The manufacturer can offer
product to the retailer on the condition that it be
promoted at price  p1 the channel profit-maximizing
price.  To obtain the retailers cooperation, the
manufacturer need only lower w to a level that
increases the retailer’s profits from the nonpromoted
level.  Figure 5 illustrates a trade promotion's impact on
prices and profits.  At the nonpromoted retail price level,
p2 , the channel profit .the manufacturer has profits
equal to the area, wbde.  The retailer earns profits equal
to area,  . 2abw p   With promotion the retailer agrees to
sell at  p1 and the manufacturer lowers the wholesale
price to w1.  The retailer participates in the trade
promotion because its profits, area  p fiw 11 , are greater
than its nonpromotion profits, area abw p2 .
Manufacturer profits under promotion are area w ige 1 ,
which is larger than nonpromotion profits, wbde.
Under the trade promotion scenario both the
manufacturer and retailer share the increased profits due
to the elimination of double marginalization.  Thus an
old logistically inefficient workhorse in the food system,
trade promotions, has not been put out to pasture.  It has
a new more central role for pricing efficiency in
concentrated food channels.Continuing Concentration in the US Cotterill
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The retailer, however, has a second marketing
strategy that can dominate participation in a trade
promotion.  If the retailer can introduce a private label
product of equal quality and consumer acceptance, i.e. a
product that destroys all manufacturer brand equity built
up due to advertising, product trademarks, and design,
the retailer can appropriate all of the profits earned at
pQ 11  in figures 4 and 5.  Private label products,
however, rarely are so successful that they eliminate
manufacturer brands but clearly they diminish national
brand pricing power (Cotterill et al. 2000).  Trade
promotion by manufacturers reduces the incentives for
development of private labels, and the amount of brand
equity that manufacturers have created also affects
retailers ability to introduce private label products. One
cannot analyze private label pricing in a vacuum.
Nonetheless, the rapid growth of private label products
in the 1990’s is in large part due to the problem of
successive monopoly in the food system.
5. An Out of the Box Solution:  Truly National
Supermarket Chains
Moves to improve channel coordination and pricing
efficiency such as trade promotions, ECR, category
management, and copycat private label programs are “in
the box” solutions.  They don’t challenge the structure of
the food-marketing channel, essentially leaving the food-
manufacturing firms intact and in control of the content
of the system.  Although U.S. supermarket chains are
larger in absolute size than their European markets
counterparts, and they dominate regions of the U.S.
comparable in size to many European countries, unlike
many European supermarket chains they have not
established themselves as channel captains by instituting
strong retail brands via supply chain management
programs.
2  In the U.S. this is an “out of the box” move
that would diminish the position and stock market value
of large U.S. food manufacturers.  The breakfast cereal
industry has experienced a very strong taste of this since
1995 (Cotterill, 1999c).
The next phase in retail concentration may well be
the harbinger of such a radical shift in economic fortunes
in the U.S. food system.  That phase is the emergence of
truly national supermarket chains, unseen in the U.S.
since the heyday of A&P in the 1930’s and 1940s.  In
the near future, we undoubtedly will see more mergers
                                               
2 Cotterill (1997) discusses this option and whether developed
nations’ food systems might converge to it.  See Wrigley
(1999), a leading British geographer, for a very interesting
European perspective on the transformation of U.S. food
retailing.
among the top 10 supermarket chains.  Since this is an
“out of the box” solution, lets speculate on some feasible
geographic combinations that would assemble truly
national chains with significant national market shares.
Using Table 7 as a base, and ignoring the impact of
horizontal divestitures that attempt to protect
competition in local market areas, if Kroger, Safeway,
Winn Dixie and Shaws (Midwest, West, South, and
Northeast) combined, the resulting company would be
truly national in scope with sales of $86.4 billion and a
national market share of 21.5%.  A second combination
could be Albertsons, Ahold, Food Lion, and Meijer
(West, East, South and Midwest).  It would have sales of
$77.9 billion and a national market share of 19.3 percent.
These two mammoth chains would account for slightly
over 40 percent of supermarket sales.  Walmart’s much
ballyhooed expansion by building supercenters is trivial
in comparison.  A third combination could assemble
another 20 percent firm in response to these conjectured
consolidations.  These three firms plus a larger Walmart,
e.g. 10 percent SOM, would put national four-firm
concentration at 70 percent.
Consolidation to this level would have two major
impacts.  The first is a quantum leap in bargaining power
that was the basis for the Robinson Patman Act (the anti
A&P act) in the 1930’s.  Recently, the American
Antitrust Institute (AAI) and Wakefern Food
Corporation, Elizabeth, New Jersey, the nation’s largest
retailer-owned cooperative wholesale, petitioned the
FTC on, among other things, this issue.  The AAI
already is concerned that recent mergers have, in fact,
generated sufficient size disparity in the supermarket
industry to trigger Robinson Patman claims:
“What we are calling the mega-chains–the five
largest retail grocery sellers–exercise enormous
buying power, which they employ against the food
producers and manufacturers.  The sheer size of the
mega-chains looms as a lever–the manufacturers
must get their products onto the shelves of the
largest retailers, even if they have to pay higher,
even exorbitant, slotting and other allowances and
make other costly concessions–which they are
forced to do.  As a result, manufacturers may raise
their prices to all customers in order to earn an
acceptable return on investment.  In that case, all
other customers subsidize the mega-chains.
...smaller customers are always at a competitive
disadvantage, because they are not receiving the
higher allowances and other concessions, which
effectively raises their cost of goods.”(Foer, 1999,
p.7).Continuing Concentration in the US Cotterill
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The R-P Act may come to the forefront after decades
of relatively inactive and marginal enforcement.  It gives
retailers (read smaller ones) legal recourse against
manufacturers that grant discounts to other retailers (read
larger ones) that are not cost justified.  In the conjectured
scenario, manufacturers would have two choices: either
give all retailers noncost justified discounts that large
retailers demand, or give no one such discounts.
This latter option may not be sustainable in the long
run because the truly national chains may go out of the
box.  They may develop strong retail brands that
supplant or at least significantly curtail time honored
manufacturer brands.  Leading manufacturers and
smaller retail chains would both lose position in the food
system.
Whether this large chain strategy is viable depends
upon the trade off between economies of specialization
versus economies of scope in branding food products.
Economies of scale and scope in production and
distribution are not an issue.  Branded food companies,
for example, in fruits, vegetables and cheese have spun
off production to agricultural cooperatives.  They buy
the product as a graded commodity and then put their
brand on it.  Supermarkets in Europe do the same with
their supply chain management approach.
Does a company such as Kellogg’s or Campbell’s
have a competitive advantage in branding new products
in cereal or soups, or does a truly national supermarket
chain have the edge because of scope economies?  If
advertising is losing its punch due to new technologies,
then the era of branding food products with TV media
may be over (see Box 3).
Box 3:  Goodbye to Advertising As We Know It
“Thanks to smart new VCR-like machines from Silicon
Valley, the viewer is king, media moguls are fretting, and
advertisers are terrified.  A DVR (Digital Video Recorder)
incorporates a hard-disk drive, a modem, and silicon circuitry.
It converts TV programs entering your home via cable,
satellite dish, or antenna into digital bits (up to 30 hours’
worth) that the hard drive can store for you to view at your
convenience… It’s a Trojan horse that could
surprise…advertisers with radical change…  That’s because,
yes, DVRs let you skip commercials with ease.  Advertisers
will feel added pressure to come up with ads “sticky” enough
to keep viewers from zapping them… Forrester Research of
Cambridge, Mass., predicts that 13% of U.S. households will
have one by 2004, an adoption rate faster than that of VCRs.”
(Schlender 1999)
If a retailer can establish a uniform high quality
reputation across several categories, the retailer name
alone would be the brand, and it would be transferable to
new product categories.  Underlying this economy of
scope argument is the supposition that truly national
chains could develop extensive managerial cadre that
could work with smaller manufacturers in a supply chain
management context to produce and market truly
innovative new foods and high quality established foods.
Truly national chains could make more effective use of
TV media that is segmented along demographic rather
than geographic lines.  These chains would not rely on
leading manufacturer brands to do category
management.  Their own management would do it.
Fundamentally, this battle for channel control distills
down to whether large old-line food manufacturers, or
new retailer “product development and marketing”
departments working with smaller possibly more
experimental and entrepreneurial food manufacturers can
be the most innovative and creative.
Truly national chains may also be able to capitalize
more quickly on two emerging trends: meal solutions
and international cuisine affinity centers within stores.
With continuing economic growth, wealthier consumers
will pay for prepared meals rather than branded
ingredients to combine and cook at home.  Affinity
centers will replace the traditional aisles of packaged
groceries with more circular areas that will offer an array
of prepared ready-to-eat meals and ingredients for a
particular cuisine such as Indian or Mexican.
If, in fact, economies of scope at retail can dominate
economies of specialization at the manufacturing level
for the marketing of specific food products, we may very
well eliminate double marginalization in food channels;
however, we would be left with a food system
dominated by retailers who are shared
monopolists/monopsonists.  Can three or four huge retail
bureaucracies truly be efficient and responsive?  The
monopsonistic power of large retailers against primary
food producers is already becoming a concern among
U.S. farmers.  Recently, farmer groups were concerned
when a glut of pork depressed farm level prices by more
than 50 percent for several months, but retail pork prices
remained unchanged.  Rapid and responsive price
transmission is necessary to expand consumer demand in
such situations to reduce the severity of commodity price
cycles.
Unless antitrust enforcement is significantly
tightened, mergers will continue to contribute to
concentration at all stages of the food system.  Antitrust
challenges at retail may very well be supported by
manufacturers and small retailers as well as consumers
to the extent that they curtail double marginalization,Continuing Concentration in the US Cotterill
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limit the bargaining power of large retailers, and
preclude the European solution.  Nonetheless, if
concentration in local retail markets and in food
manufacturing markets continues to increase, problems
of double marginalization will increase creating even
more impetus for vertical coordination.  Third party
marketing firms that facilitate vertical coordination in all
phases of marketing will thrive.  Those include A.C.
Neilsen Information Resources, Inc., Catalina Marketing
with its electronic in-store coupons, Vlassis with
newspaper coupons, and News America/Actmedia with
newspaper coupons and in-store electronic and paper
promotion programs.
The European retail brand/supply chain management
model is a real and viable option (Cotterill 1997).  But
most American marketing pundits prefer a more diverse
less bureaucratic food system with cooperative efforts to
improve coordination.  A tougher stance against retailer
mergers by antitrust agencies would preserve a more
diverse system.  We end this essay with the insight
proffered in the introduction.  No one knows with
certainty how this dynamic scenario will play out.  It
depends on strategic moves by the world'’ leading food
firms and public policy, especially antitrust enforcement.
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Table 1. Food Processing Magazine’s Top 25 U.S. Food Processing Companies, 1998
Millions $
Rank Company Food Sales Total Sales Percent Food
  1 Philip Morris Companies, Inc. 31,527 71,592 44
  2 Conagra, Inc. 28,840 28,840 100
  3 Cargill, Inc. 21,400 51,000 42
  4 Pepsico, Inc. 20,917 20,917 100
  5 The Coca-Cola Company 18,800 18,868 100
  6 Archer Daniels Midland Company 16,109 16,109 100
  7 Mars Inc. 14,000 14,000 100
  8 IBP, Inc. 13,259 13,259 100
  9 Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. 12,832 12,832 100
10 Sara Lee Corporation 10,800 20,000 54
11 H.J. Heinz Company 9,209  9,209 100
12 Nabisco, Inc. 8,734 8,734 100
13 Bestfoods 8,400 8,400 100
14 Nestle USA, Inc. 7,800 7,800 100
15 Dairy Farmers of America 7,000   7,000 100
16 Kellogg Company 6,830 6,830 100
17 Campbell Soup Company 6,696 6,696 100
18 The Pillsbury Company   6,500 6,500 100
19 Tyson Foods, Inc. 6,356   6,356 100
20 General Mills, Inc. 6,033 6,033 100
21 Quaker Oats Company 5,010   5,010 100
22 The Proctor & Gamble Company   4,376 37,154 12
23 Dole Food Co., Inc.   4,336 4,336 100
24 Hershey Foods Corporation 4,300 4,300 100
25 Land O’Lakes, Inc. 4,195 4,195 100
Source:  The 1998 Top 100 Food Companies, Food Processing, December 1998 Issue.Continuing Concentration in the U.S. Cotterill
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Table 2. Leading Company Advertisers in Food and Tobacco Processing, 1997
Rank Company 1997 Advertising Expenditure Percent Of Total Cumulative Percent
1 Philip Morris Inc. $1,313,430.9 17.48 17.48
2 General Mill's 416,684.6 5.55 23.03
3 Kellogg Co. 403,215.5 5.37 28.39
4 Coca-Cola Co. 317,190.1 4.22 32.62
5 Pepsico Inc. 292,467.8 3.89 36.51
6 RJR Nabisco 287,243.6 3.82 40.33
7 Anheuser-Busch Inc. 263,366.1 3.51 43.84
8 Diageo PLC* 251,715.8 3.35 47.19
9 Campbell Soup Co. 250,726.4 3.34 50.53
10 Mars 192,424.4 2.56 53.09
11 Nestle 183,748.4 2.45 55.53
12 Quaker Oats Co 176,602.1 2.35 57.88
13 Proctor & Gamble 174,623.4 2.32 60.21
14 Hershey Foods Corp 174,331.7 2.32 62.53
15 Unilever 142,082.1 1.89 64.42
16 William Wrigley Co 139,334.7 1.85 66.27
17 Adolph Coors 139,289.6 1.85 68.13
18 Seagram Co 114,412.9 1.52 69.65
19 Conagra Inc. 91,537.2 1.22 70.87
20 Slim Fast 78,959.0 1.05 71.92
21 Bat Industries 68,861.6 0.92 72.84
* Includes the following subsidiaries: Pillsbury, Green Giant Vegetables, Haagen-Dazs, Old El Paso, Guiness.
Source: Calculated from Competitive Media Reporting, 1998.  Based on  a total $7.513 billion in advertising for cigarettes and food products.
Table 3. Mean Values for Supermarket Four Firm Concentration
Ratios in MSA Areas:1987 and 1998
All MSA's   FL CA NE MW
1998    74.4 72.4 90.7 73.5 69.3
1987 64.5 60.0 82.9 59.7 60.6
n= 94 10 6 26 13
Source: Trade Dimensions Market Scope 1988, 1999.Continuing Concentration in the U.S. Cotterill
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Table 4. Supermarket Sales and Concentration Ratios for Selected
Regions in the U.S., 1992
Region
Area Rank Chain Share Population





5 Alpha Beta(Food 4 Less) 5.4
C2= 32.8
C4= 50.1




4 Kash N Karry 5.7




1                                                                          53,798,000
1 A&P(Tengelman) 12.4
2 Pathmark 8.0
3 Giant Food Inc. 5.5
4 Acme (American) 4.7












1 Includes Washington D.C., Baltimore, Pennsylvania, New York, and New England
2 Includes Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Minnesota.
Source: Cotterill, R.W. 1997. The Food Distribution System of the Future:  Convergence Towards the US or UK Model? Agribusiness 13(2):123-
135.Continuing Concentration in the U.S. Cotterill
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Table 5. Supermarket Sales and Concentration Ratios for Selected Regions in the U.S.1998
Region Total U.S. Total Global
Area Sales Region Corporate Sales Sales
(population) Rank Chain ($ Billion) Share ($ Billion) ($ Billion)
California                                                              $31.1                                                                       
(32 million) 1 Albertsons/Lucky 7.6 24.5 35.7
2 Safeway/Vons 6.9 22.0 25.0
3 Ralphs(Kroger) 5.6 18.1 43.1
4 Stater Bros. 1.6 5.2 1.7
5 Raleys 0.7 2.4 2.5
C2= 46.5
C4= 69.8
Florida                                                                  $16.2                                                                          
(14.6 million) 1 Publix 7.0 43.1 12.1
2 Winn Dixie 4.4 26.9 13.9
3 Albertson's 1.5 9.5 35.7
4 Food Lion(Del Haize) 1.3 8.2 10.2 14.5





2                                                            $69.7                                                                       
(57.9 million) 1 Ahold
3 15.9 22.8 23.4 25.9
2 A&P(Tengelmann) 5.3 7.6 10.5 29.6
3 Shop Rite/Wakefern 3.9 5.6 5.2
4 Shaws(Sainsbury) 3.7 5.3 4.2 23.8




4                                                     $40.6                                                                       
(34.1 million) 1 Kroger 6.1 15.1 43.1
2 Jewel(Albertsons) 3.3 8.2 35.7
3 Dominick's (Safeway) 2.5 6.3 25.0
4 A&P(Tengelmann) 1.8 4.4 10.5 29.6
5 Meijer 1.7 4.2 8.6
C2= 23.3
C4= 34.0
1 Grocery sales account for 40% of the total Wal Mart sales or $12.8b.
2 Includes Washington D.C., Baltimore, Pennsylvania, New York, and New England
3 AHOLD operates Bi-Lo, Edwards/Finast, Giant Food Stores, Tops,  Stop & Shop, Giant (Landover MD), and Pathmark (assuming approval with no
divestiture).
4 Includes Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Minnesota.
Source:  Trade Dimensions, Market Scope 1999, Trade Dimensions, Marketing Guidebook 1999, Bureau of Census Population. Fortune Global 500,
1998, www.fortune.com. Forbes, Top 100 Largest Private Companies, www.forbes.com.Continuing Concentration in the U.S. Cotterill
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Table 6. Top 20 Supermarket Chains, Total U.S. 1992
Sales
Rank Chain ($  Billion) Share
1 Kroger 21.9 7.7
2  American 19.0 6.6
3  Safeway 15.1 5.3
4  A&P/Tengelmann 10.7 3.7
5  Winn-Dixie 10.3 3.6
6  Albertson's 10.2 3.6
7  Food Lion 7.1 2.5
8  AHOLD* 6.3 2.2
9  Publix 6.1 2.1
10  Vons 5.6 2.0
11  Penn Traffic/Grand Union 5.6 2.0
12  Supermarkets General 4.7 1.6
13  HE Butt 3.8 1.3
14  Giant Food (Landover, MD) 3.5 1.2
15  Stop & Shop 3.2 1.1
16  Food 4 Less 3.0 1.0
17  Ralph's 2.9 1.0
18  Bruno's 2.7 0.9
19  Roundy's 2.5 0.9





* Ahold operates Bi-Lo, Edwards/Finast, Giant Food Stores, Tops,  Stop & Shop, Giant (Landover MD),
Source:  Supermarket News January 18, 1993. The Food Institute Food Retailing Review 1994, Fair Lawn, NJ.  Trade Dimensions, Marketing
Guidebook, 1994, Supermarket sales of $286.3b.Continuing Concentration in the U.S. Cotterill
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report #48 15
 Table 7. Top 20 Supermarket Chains, Total U.S. 1998
Sales
Rank Chain ($  Billion) Share
1 Kroger 43.1 10.8
2 Albertsons/American 35.7 8.9
3 Safeway/Vons 25.0 6.2
4 AHOLD* 23.4 5.8
5 Winn-Dixie 13.9 3.5
6 Wal Mart 12.8 3.2
7 Publix 12.1 3.0
8 A&P(Tengelman) 10.5 2.6
9 Food Lion(Del Haize) 10.2 2.5
10 Meijer 8.6 2.1
11 H.E. Butt 6.9 1.7
12 ShopRite(Wakefern ) 5.2 1.3
13 Shaw's(Sainsbury) 4.2 1.0
14 SuperValu 4.1 1.0
15 Giant Eagle 4.0 1.0
16 Fleming 3.5 0.9
17 Hannaford(Sobey's) 3.4 0.8
18 Hy Vee 3.2 0.8
19 Penn Traffic/Grand Union 2.8 0.7





* AHOLD operates Bi-Lo, Edwards/Finast, Giant Food Stores, Tops,  Stop & Shop, Giant (Landover MD), and Pathmark (assuming approval with
no divestiture).
Source:  Supermarket News January 25, 1999. Supermarket sales of $400.5b.Continuing Concentration in the U.S. Cotterill
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Table 8. Supermarket Merger Activity in the U.S., 1991 to 1999
Transaction AggregateValue
2
Year Acquiree Acquirer Value
1 Sales EBITDA
1991 Almac's Leonard Green 125.0 N.A. 7.5
American Stores Food 4 Less 248.0 0.2 4.5
Tops(Freeman Spogli) Royal Ahold 125.5 0.2 6.4
Purity Supreme Freeman Spogli 319.9 0.3 5.9
Williams Brothers Vons Companies 48.0 0.2 N.A.
1992 Baker's Supermarkets Fleming Cos. 50.0 0.2 N.A.
Cullum Randall's 468.0 0.4 7.7
Grand Union
3 Grand Union 1,404.7 0.5 7.1
Jewel (TX/OK/FL) Albertson's 455.0 0.3 5.3
Wetterau Inc. SUPERVALU 1,164.6 0.2 6.8
1993 Big Star Stores Great A&P 121.0 0.3 N.A.
Insalaco Penn Traffic 45.0 0.3 N.A.
Pueblo International Cisneros Group 418.0 0.3 5.9
1994 Acme N.E. PA Penn Traffic 94.0 0.3 5.8
Ralph's Grocery Food 4 Less 1,581.0 0.6 6.9
Scrivner, Inc. Fleming Cos. 1,085.0 0.2 6.4
Smitty's Yucaipa 168.0 0.3 6.2
Star Markets Investcorp 285.0 0.3 6.7
Wilson's Hannaford Bros. 127.0 0.6 7.4
1995 Bruno's KKR 1,233.3 0.4 8.0
Dominick's Yucaipa 693.0 0.3 6.2
Jitney Jungle Bruckman, Rosser 317.5 N.A. 5.9
Mayfair Royal Ahold 188.0 0.3 7.6
Purity Supreme Stop & Shop 255.0 0.3. 7.9
1996 Hughes Quality Foods 391.5 0.3 6.4
Kash & Karry Food Lion 342.5 0.3 6.0
Smitty's Smith's Food & Drug 195.4 0.3 6.7
Stop & Shop Royal Ahold 2,900.0 0.7 8.9
Vons Safeway 3,447.2 0.6 9.9
1997 Delchamps Jitney Jungle 244.4 0.2 6.6
Quality Food Centers Fred Meyer 1,700.0 0.9 11.2
Ralph's Grocery Fred Meyer 3,100.0 0.6 8.2
Randall's Food Markets KKR N.A. N.A. N.A.
Riser Foods Giant Eagle 403.0 0.3 7.2
Smith's Food & Drugs Fred Meyer 2,000.0 0.7 7.3
1998 American Stores Albertson's Inc. 11,700.0 0.6 8.5
Buttrey Foods Albertson's Inc. 169.0 0.5 10.2
Carr Gottstein Safeway 330.0 0.6 7.2
Dominick's Safeway 1,846.2 0.7 10.0
Fred Meyer Kroger 12,800.0 0.8 10.0
Giant Food Royal Ahold 2,790.3 0.7 12.2
John C. Groub Co. Kroger  121.5 0.5 11.0
Sessel Holdings Albertson's Inc. 88.0 0.5 9.3
Star Markets J. Sainsbury 759.0 0.5 N.A.
1999 Pathmark Royal Ahold 1,750.0 0.5 N.A.
(1
st half) Glen's Markets Spartan Stores N.A. N.A. N.A.
Family Fare Supermarkets Spartan Stores N.A. N.A. N.A.
Cox Supermarkets Marsh Supermarkets, Inc N.A. N.A. N.A.
Note: All sales figures in million dollars.
1 Includes completed and pending transactions.
2 "Aggregate Value" equals net debt plus equity.
3 As part of recapitalization, Salomon Brothers sold its 40.7% stake in Grand Union.
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Figure 2. Histogram of Supermarket Four Firm Concentration Ratios
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A1987Source: Cotterill, R.W. 1999. An Antitrust Economic Analysis of the Proposed Acquisition of Supermarkets General Holdings Corporation by Ahold Acquisition Inc. Food
Marketing Policy Center, University of Connecticut
Storrs, CT 06269, April 19.
Figure 3. Scatterplot for Local Market Concentration and Price Level:
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